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INTRODUCTION

Both in policy' and in practice,2 arbitration is a favored method
of dispute resolution. As a matter of standard practice, commercial
contracts often contain arbitration clauses which typically are very
broad, providing for arbitration of all disputes which arise from the
contractual relationship. However, the judiciary has historically prohibited punitive arbitration awards, thus precluding arbitrators from
fashioning a complete remedy in many instances.3 The capstone of
this tradition, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 4 decided in 1976, held
that an arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if
allowed in the agreement between the parties.' The Garrity court
posited that punitive arbitration awards impinged upon the authority of the judiciary and were prone to abuse, and were thus violative
of public policy.' Although Garrity was frequently followed,7 a number of courts implicitly acted contrary to Garrity.'
The first faltering break from the Garrity doctrine occurred in
the 1983 case of Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.9 Holding that federal law applied, the district court in Willis was able to
distinguish Garrity on the basis that it restricted the power of arbitrators only under state law, not federal law.10 Only one year later,
the Willis doctrine advanced a major step further in the case of Willoughby Roofing v. Kajima International, Inc.," in which the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina upheld an arbitral award of punitive damages on its own
merit." In this watershed ruling, the Willoughby court held that
public policy did not prohibit arbitrators from making punitive
damage awards.' 3
1. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (the Arbitration Act "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration . . . [and] questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"). See also Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
2. In 1984, almost 40,000 commercial, labor, and accident cases were filed with
the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1985).
3. See Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliveries' Union, 280 A.D. 500,
504, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1952).
4. 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1976).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 833-34, 353 N.E.2d at 796.
7. See infra note 62.
8. Courts implicitly acted contrary to Garrity by compelling arbitration of punitive damage claims.
9. 569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
10. Id. at 823.
11. 598 F. Supp 353 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
12. Id. at 364-65.
13. Id. at 359-61.
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Significantly, the Willoughby court reasoned that a prohibition
of punitive awards would undermine the value of arbitration and
frustrate punitive damage policy."' In apparent consensus, nearly
every decision for the past three years has followed the Willoughby
rule and upheld punitive arbitration awards. 5
This article will present a historical analysis of the role of punitive damages in arbitration, and propose guidelines under which arbitrators should be empowered to award punitive damages.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The History Of Arbitration

With the passage of the Arbitration Act of 19256 (the "Arbitration Act"), Congress established a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 7 This legislation represented the first break from the English tradition in which the judiciary refused to enforce arbitration
agreements on the basis that such agreements impinged upon the
courts' jurisdiction. Prior to the passage of the Arbitration Act,
American courts criticized this judicial attitude as illogical and unjust. Nevertheless, the precept was considered too deeply rooted to
be overruled without legislative enactment.'8
The Arbitration Act provides that a written agreement to arbitrate in any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.""' The statute further provides that any party aggrieved by
the improper refusal of another party to commence arbitration may
petition a federal court of competent jurisdiction for an order compelling arbitration. If the formation of an arbitration agreement is
not at issue, "the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement."20 The Arbitration Act was necessitated by the traditional reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration clauses,2 ' and simply codi14. Id. at 362-64.
15. See, e.g., Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984);
Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985); In re
Costa and Head (Atrium), Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1986).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1982).
17. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
18. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
19. 9 U.S.C. §2 (1982).
20. Id. § 4. (emphasis added). The Arbitration Act also provides that if a claim
is brought before any federal court upon any issue referable to arbitration under a
written agreement, the court shall, on the application of a party, stay the trial until
arbitration has been had in accordance with the agreement. Id. § 3.
21. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-21.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 21:21

fies the common law duty of courts to enforce the terms of valid
contracts.22
Despite the simple and direct language of the Arbitration Act,
there has been considerable disagreement in the federal judiciary
over its procedural" and substantive interpretation and application.
Disagreement over the substantive interpretation of the Arbitration
Act resulted in the common judicial refusal to enforce arbitration
clauses in disputes arising under federal remedial legislation. The
judiciary has often found arbitration to be an unsuitable method of
dispute resolution, 2 4 and has generally precluded arbitration in the
areas of securities,28 antitrust, 6 bankruptcy, 2 and RICO disputes.28
22. Id. at 219-20. (the Act "creates no new legislation, no new rights, except a
remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts .
) (quoting 65 CONG.
REC. 1931 (1924)).
23. Procedural issues focused on the judicial severance of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, with the resultant arbitration of the former and judicial review of
the latter. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1027
(11th Cir. 1982); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1979). If both
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims arose out of the same transaction,. however,
courts have questioned the wisdom and practicality of severing the arbitrable claims.
Belke, 693 F.2d at 1026; Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, (5th Cir. 1981);
Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Judicial authorities have noted the inefficiency of bifurcated proceedings related to a single transaction, and have expressed concern for the possible preclusive effect of factual issues resolved by arbitration. Belke, 693 F.2d at 1026; Miley, 637 F.2d at 334-37;
Cunningham, 550 F. Supp. at 585.
As a result of this procedural dilemma, several federal circuits until recently applied the "intertwining doctrine." The "intertwining doctrine" provided that federal
district courts, in their discretion, could refuse to compel arbitration of arbitrable
claims under a written agreement where such claims were so intertwined with nonarbitrable claims that their severance could result in substantial inefficiency or collateral estoppel problems. In Byrd, the Supreme Court sounded the death knell of the
intertwining doctrine. See infra note 28.
24. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d
823 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding arbitration clauses void as to the federal securities laws
concerned); Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116
(7th Cir. 1978) (holding antitrust claims inappropriate for enforcement by arbitrator);
Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.) (holding a trustee cannot be forced to arbitrate his claims under the securities laws and bankruptcy act), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
910 (1977); S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l., Inc., 576 F. Supp.
566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding arbitration clauses unenforceable in the areas of antitrust, bankruptcy, § 10(b)-(5) claims and RICO respectively).
25. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding claims brought under 1933
Securities Act non-arbitrable). See also Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
v. Moore, 590 F.2d at 829 (both holding claims brought under § 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and § 10(b)-(5) claims non-arbitrable, following Wilko); Sibley
v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
26. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d 155 (1st
Cir. 1983), modified, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. Int'l Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
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The judiciary has advanced several rationales for rejecting arbitration in these areas. The most palatable of these rationales is that
Congress-for example, in the Securities Act of 1933-has legislatively mandated that parties may not waive their rights to judicial
proceedings through private agreements.2"
In the recent trilogy of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,30
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,"'and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,3 2 the United States Supreme Court rejected the traditional judicial antipathy to arbitration and significantly broadened the scope of enforceability of
arbitration agreements. In Byrd, the Supreme Court rejected application of the intertwining doctrine, thus requiring arbitration of arbitrable claims irrespective of non-arbitrable claims. In Mitsubishi,
the Court deemed international antitrust disputes to be arbitrable,
notwithstanding the judicial hostility to the arbitration of domestic
antitrust disputes. Most recently, in McMahon, the Supreme Court
expanded the substantive scope of arbitrability by enforcing agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.
Thus, federal policy, embodied in the Arbitration Act and in the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, unequivocally favors arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. 33 As the Supreme Court recently observed in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth: "[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution. '3 4 Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that
(2d Cir. 1968); A & E Plastic Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afJd, 550 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
27. See Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3rd Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); In re Braniff Airways, 33 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1983); Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Good Hope
Indus., 16 Bankr. 719 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Cross Elec. Co., 9 Bankr. 408
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981); In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 22 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982).
28. Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 867 (W.D.
Pa. 1985); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 510
(W.D. Pa. 1984); Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735
(W.D. N.C. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
29. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
30. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
31. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
32. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
33. Id. at 98.
34. 473 U.S. at 626-27. Accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). (Arbitration Act "is a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration ... [and] questions of arbitrability must be
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the effect of the Arbitration Act was to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, and that the Arbitration Act "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration
...
" Indeed, since the Wilko decision in 1953, every relevant Supreme Court decision has favored arbitration.3"
In Byrd, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the Arbitration Act, by its terms, mandates that the district court "shall direct
the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed. 37 The Supreme Court's message
is clear: "[T]he only legitimate ground upon which to decline enforcement of an arbitration clause is the manifest congressional intention to the contrary.""8
With the watershed Byrd, Mitsubishi and McMahon rulings,
the Supreme Court has swept away any doubts about the enforceability of valid arbitration clauses. In essence, the Supreme Court
has finally placed arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts, and has signalled its intention to enforce the arbitrability of virtually all actions. Presumably, the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncements will accelerate the judicial acceptance of punitive damages as a valid component of the substantive law of
arbitrability.
B. The History Of Punitive Damages
The earliest system of law to utilize civil punitive damages was
the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. 9 Prior to the Eighteenth Cenaddressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (in passing the Arbitration Act, "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration ... [that] mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements"); See also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[tihere is nothing in the record ... to indicate that the arbitral system
...would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.") The recent
opinions of Mitsubishi, Moses H. Cone, and Southland lend well-founded support for
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting language in Wilko.
35. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. See also Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1016 (Congress did not intend to limit Arbitration Act to only federal court
jurisdiction).
36. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614; Byrd, 470 U.S. 213; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at
2-3 (holding preempted state laws invalidating arbitration clauses otherwise valid
under Arbitration Act); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 2 (holding a federal district
court's stay of federal suit seeking arbitration under § 4 of Arbitration Act improper);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 396 (1967) (holding
that where one party to a contract containing an arbitration clause claims fraud in
the inducement of the contract generally, the claim must be settled in arbitration
according to the terms of the arbitration clause).
37. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218 (emphasis in original).
38. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26.
39. G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500-01 (1952); A. KOCOUREK &
J. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 387-442. (1915).
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tury, English courts had upheld jury verdicts that exceeded the
plaintiff's actual physical harm. 0 As early as 1763, an English court
employed the term "exemplary damages" in the case of Huckle v.
Money,"' to recognize that a jury could return a valid monetary
award in excess of actual damages.
The first American enunciation of the theory of punitive damages occurred in a 1791 case of breach of promise to marry, 2 when
damages were awarded "for example's sake." Currently, all but four
states-Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington-en-3
dorse punitive damages as a proper component of the common law.4
And all of these four states have statutory exceptions to the proscription on this practice."
Civil awards of punitive or exemplary damages"5 have been generally justified by four rationales, or policy objectives.' First, a majority of jurisdictions recognize that the primary purpose of punitive
damages is to punish flagrant wrongdoers, and to deter them and
others from repeating the offense."7 The second rationale is that pu40. K.

REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 26 § 2.2(A)(2)(1980).
41. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
42. Corgell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791).
43. See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHUR, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE (1984).
See, e.g., McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932); City of
Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265 (1943);
Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); Kammerer v. Western Gear
Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Jeansonne v. Marath, 61 So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (Louisiana
allows multiple damages for personal injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 27
(West 1974) (Massachusetts allows treble recovery for discharge of sewage into
coastal waters); NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-1808 (1984) (Nebraska allows double damages
for violation of its Livestock Sellers Protective Act); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090
(1978) (Washington allows treble damage award for violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act).
45. Punitive or exemplary damages afford a plaintiff recovery in excess of the
amount necessary to compensate for proven loss or injury. To justify such a recovery,
the aggrieved party is generally required to demonstrate that the conduct complained
of was wilful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, or reckless. See D.DoBs, REMEDIES 205 §

3.9 (1973). See generally K.

REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES

161-556 (1980) (providing a

detailed discussion of the standards employed by various courts in the assessment of
punitive damages).
46. See Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in
Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 5, 6 (1980); Long, Punitive Damages: An
Unsettled Doctrine. 25 DRAKE L. REV. 875, 879 (1976).
47.. J. GHIRDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 43, § 4.14 & n.1 (citing cases and statutes from 36 states and the District of Columbia). As a noted torts expert has stated:
The idea of punishment, usually does not enter into tort law, except in so far
as it may lead the courts to weigh the scales somewhat in favor of the plaintiff's interest in determining that a tort has been committed in the first place.
In one rather anomalous respect, however, the ideas underlying the criminal
law have invaded the field of torts. Where the defendant's wrongdoing has
been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently
associated with crime, all but a few courts have permitted the jury to award in
the tort action "punitive" or "exemplary" damages, or what is sometimes
called "smart money." Such damages are given to the plaintiff over and above
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nitive damages are mere monetary awards that supplement compensatory damages. 8 The third rationale is that punitive awards offer
an element of revenge both to the injured party and to society as a
whole.' 9 The fourth rationale is that punitive awards will promote
justice by providing an incentive to pursue causes of action where
the damages are nominal, but where the defendant's behavior subjects society to substantial risks.
It is nearly impossible to generalize as to the guidelines under
which punitive damages are imposed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions focus on the nature of the defendant's conduct, rather than the nature of the plaintiff's harm. 50 Nevertheless,
the range of culpable conduct varies from state to state in almost
-indecipherable degrees5s Most jurisdictions adhere to the rule that
actual or compensatory damages are a prerequisite to an award of
punitive damages.52 Most jurisdictions require that punitive damages bear a "reasonable relationship" to the compensatory damages
awarded. 8 Many jurisdictions authorize the trier of fact to consider
the defendant's wealth in assessing punitive damages.5 ' These generalizations are anything but precise, and numerous other jurisprudential variables could be identified.5 5 Perhaps the Fifth Circuit best
summarized punitive damage standards: "The term [punitive damages] is too loose, vague, indefinite, and uncertain; and its meaning
often varies from state to state, court to court, and jury to jury. It is
a chameleon of the law-changing its hue to the color of the situathe full compensation for his injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching him not to do it again, and of deterring others from following
his example.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1979).
48. Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Kentucky view punitive damages as purely compensatory. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935); H. OLECK, DAMAGES To PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 269 (1961). Texas, Idaho, and Oregon view compensation as one of the major functions of punitive awards. Long, supra note 46, at
875.
49. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 205, 221 (1973).
50. See, e.g., J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 43, § 5.01; Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984).
51. See Long, supra note 46, at 879, 881 (for examples of various state conduct
requirements ranging from "oppression, fraud, or malice" to "mere caprice").
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Carr, 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978); American
Motorcycle Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 380 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Pringle
Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1979); Traylor v. Wachter, 227
Kan. 221, 607 P.2d 1094 (1980); Robison v. Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 610 P.2d 201 (1980);
Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934); Cates v.
Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982). However, D. DOBBS, supra note 45, § 3.9, at 208
suggests that a number of jurisdictions hold otherwise.
53. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 58 (1982); Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1117, 1145.
54. See K. REDDEN, supra note 45, at 61; Ellis, supra note 53, at 54.
55. See Long, supra note 46, at 880-83; Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1130-54.
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tion on which it may be used.""
Not surprisingly, punitive damages have come under harsh attack in recent years."7 Many commentators perceive that the claims
for, and awards of, punitive damages increased greatly in the past
few years."8 Critics also perceive that the size of awards has grown
steadily, and that an ever larger number of verdicts can properly be
described as excessive." In reality, punitive awards have grown in
size and absolute number, but have not grown in relative
frequency. 0

An array of arguments has been advanced against the theoretical underpinnings of punitive damages." Perhaps the strongest criticism is that punitive damages do not serve their ostensible goals,
and are no longer needed. First, critics note that the compensatory
damages concept was broadened long ago to include total compensation, including tangible and intangible, direct and indirect harm.
This has made compensation a less than viable justification for the
imposition of punitive damages." To the contrary, punitive damages
now often simply provide a windfall to the plaintiff.63 Second, many
56. Northwestern Nat. Gas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Gewin, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine
Which Should Be Abolished (Def. Research Inst., 1969); Ellis, supra note 53, at 7678; Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); Long, supra
note 46 at 888-89; Sales & Cole, supra note 50;
58. See Belli, supra note 46, Ellis supra note 53, at 2; Morrison, Punitive Damages and Why the Reinsurer Cares, 20 FORUM 73 (1984); TRB: The Tort Explosion,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1985, at 4.
59. See also Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1154 & n.167 (and cases cited
therein).
60. The total amount awarded in 1980-84 was six times greater than in 1975-79
in the Circuit Court of Cook County (Cook County) and twice as much in the San
Francisco Superior Court (San Francisco). The size of a typical punitive award also
increased, from $20,000-$30,000 before 1980 to $50,000-$60,000 after 1980, representing a doubling in San Francisco and nearly four-fold increase in Cook County. Finally, the size of the largest awards also increased, especially in Cook County. As to
the number of punitive awards, between 1975 and 1985 the number increased by 67%
in Cook County and 53% in San Francisco. However, this "increased number" still
represented a very small number and proportion of cases: 50 cases in San Francisco
and 65 in Cook County from 1980-84, representing only 8% of trials and 14% of
plaintiff's verdicts in San Francisco and only 4% of trials and 6% of plaintiff's verdicts in Cook County. More important, despite the increase in absolute number, the
relative frequency of punitive awards, in proportion to the number of trials and number of plaintiff's verdicts, remained almost unchanged over the entire 25-year period,

in both jurisdictions.

PETERSON, SARMA & SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS 8-45 (Rand Institute 1980).

61. See Long, supra note 46, at 883-88; Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1154-71.
62. Long, supra note 46, at 888-89; Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1164-65.
63. Commentators have posited that it is difficult to understand why, when the
sufferer of a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more. And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be
punished by exemplary damages, the damages should go to the compensated sufferer,
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commentators argue that the punishment rationale is inappropriate
for civil litigation, and that punitive damages should be confined to
criminal law." Third, critics contend that the availability of liability
insurance to cover punitive damage awards vitiates the punishment
and deterrence rationales.6 5 And, at least one commentator believes
that the public justice rationale is rarely applicable.66
A final and cogent objection to punitive damages is that with no
meaningful standard available for the assessment of punitive damages, the size of the award can be expanded to fit the pleasure of
judges and juries, 67 with inadvertent harm to society at large. First,
if insurance companies pay the damages, society is ultimately penalized since, theoretically, all insurance premiums will increase to absorb the insurance companies' cost of punitive damages."8 Second, if
conduct which is potentially of social benefit is deterred by the
threat of punitive damages, society would again be the loser.69
Third, the extremely burdensome cost of discovery in punitive damage trials, coupled with the fear of unfair or outrageous jury awards,
often compels defendants to settle meritless cases,7 0 which weakens
the judicial system and results in an unfair and inefficient transfer
of wealth.
Regardless of the shortcomings of punitive damages, courts continue to award them in an attempt to meet the recognized social and
exemplary goals. 7' Punitive damages are often awarded in (1) tort
actions, when injury occurs to the person,7 property,73 or in the
and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished. K. REDDEN, supra note 40, §
7.5(E), at 624-25. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877). See also, Casey,
supra note 5.
64. See Long, supra note 46, at 884-89; Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1159.
Both commentators note that civil parties are being subject to quasi-criminal penalties without the procedural safeguards afforded under criminal law.
65. A majority of jurisdictions have judically declared that punitive damages
are insurable. Ellis, supra note 53, at 71; Morrissey, Punitive Damages-Insurability,
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257 (1981).

66. Long, supra note 46, at 889.
67. Yet, as Dobbs points out, the court can reduce punitive awards, with or
without any mention of the reasonable ratio rule. Also, new trials can be ordered as to
punitive awards. DoBBs, supra note 45, § 3.9, at 211 n.42.
68. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir.
1962).
69. Ellis, supra note 53, at 46-53.
70. Sales & Cole, supra note 50, at 1156-57.
71. See generally K. REDDEN, supra note 40, at 74-148 (punitive damages as
they apply to tort actions).
72. Injury to the person includes automobile accidents, products liability,
wrongful death, intentional torts, defamation, and medical malpractice. See K. REDDEN, supra note 40, § 4.2(A), at 72-99.
73. Injury to property includes trespass, conversion, common-law copyright,
nuisance, and seizure of property by a secured party. See K. REDDEN, supra note 40, §
4.2(C), at 101-09.
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commercial setting; 4 (2) special duty relationships; 75 and (3) vicarious liability situations.7 6 In order to minimize the disadvantages of

punitive damages, courts have historically limited the situations in
which they will be awarded. Traditionally, courts reserved punitive
damages as a tort remedy for bad faith, fraud, and oppressive and
willful conduct. 77 For many years, courts adhered to the general rule
that punitive damages may not be assessed for breach of contract. 8
Although rare, in recent years courts have awarded punitive damages in contract actions.7 9 In many instances, courts have used tortbased theories to avoid the general rule and strike a middle
ground."0
74. Injury in the commercial setting includes trademark infringement and unfair competition, and interference with business relations and employment. See K.
REDDEN, supra note 40, § 4.2(B), at 99-101.
75. See K. REDDEN, supra note 40, § 4.4.
76. See K. REDDEN, supra note 40, § 4.5.
77. Jones, Win Punitive Damages In Arbitration, A.B.A. J. May 1, 1987, at 87.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1982); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 520 (2d ed. 1977); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 437 (1964); 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 209 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1968); K. REDDEN, supra note 40, at 41-42; Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 284 (1959); Strausberg, A Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or Implied; Punitive Damages in Torts Arising Out of Contract in Maryland, 13 U. BALT.
L. REV. 275 (1984); Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality
and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977).
79. Only a few jurisdictions have explicitly recognized that breach of contract
may give rise to a claim for punitive damages. See, e.g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So.
2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974); Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384
(Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (punitive damages may be awarded against an insurer where
conduct indicates needless disregard of the consequences, malice, gross fraud, or oppressive conduct); Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst. of Detroit, 51 Mich. App. 220, 214
N.W.2d 864 (1974) (punitive damages in a contract case are proper if defendant acted
recklessly, negligently, or maliciously).
80. For example, where a promisor's conduct is sufficient to give rise to a cause
of action for breach of contract and at the same time serves as the basis for an independent cause of action for willful tort, courts in Texas and a number of other states
award punitive damages to the injured promisee. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Miami Burglar
Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175, 178 (Fla. 1976) (punitive damages allowed when breach is
attended by some intentional wrong, such as insult, abuse, or gross negligence); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (independent tortious conduct constituting more than an oppressive and malicious breach
of contract may support punitive damages); Simpson, supra note 78, at 287-88;
Strausberg, supra note 78, at 226-51; Sullivan, supra note 78, at 236-40.
Led by the South Carolina courts, a few jurisdictions have espoused the broader
view that "when . . . breach of contract is accompanied by fraudulent act . . . the
defendant may be made to respond in punitive as well as compensatory damages."
Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 115, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (1904); see Simpson, supra note
78, at 226-29; Sullivan, supra note 78, at 229-36. This rationale has been employed to
justify awards of punitive damages against securities and commodities brokers for
various acts of fraud and misconduct associated with customer's investments. See,
e.g., Kotz v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 685 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1982) (punitive
damages allowed where broker acted with deliberate and reckless disregard of his
obligations ,to his client); Miley v. Oppenheimer, 637 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1981)
(punitive damages granted where conduct malicious, wanton or oppressive). See also
Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (punitive damages against a real
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As one commentator has opined, the trend toward setting a
higher standard of conduct in commercial affairs has opened the
way for punitive damages in contract actions whenever malicious or
wrongful conduct is presented.81 Nevertheless, the same factors that
have led commentators to criticize punitive damages in the judicial
setting have led the courts to resist the application of the doctrine in
the arbitration setting. By the same token, the beneficial goals of
punitive awards are equally well served in arbitration. More importantly, the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance favors the inclusion of punitive damages as an arbitration remedy, in order to most
fully compensate the injured party and punish the wrongdoer.
III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION

A. Pre-Willoughby: Hostility To Punitive Arbitration Awards
1. Early Treatment
From 1952 to 1974, the rule of Publishers Association v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverer Union82 governed punitive awards in arbitration.8 In Publishers'Association, the New York Appellate Division vacated an award of $5,000 in punitive damages assessed
against a striking union under a collective bargaining agreement
that expressly permitted arbitral punishment. 84 The appellate division recounted the wealth of judicial precedent denying punitive
damages in contract actions, and noted that this precedent represented a strong "public and legal policy." 8 The majority believed
that enforcing the arbitral penalty would be similar to upholding a
contractual liquidated damages provision that was disproportionate
to actual damages. 86 Most importantly, the court stated that the arbitrators did not possess the authority to award punitive damages
estate broker for breach of trust); Vale v. Union Bank, 88 Cal. App. 330, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1979) (affirming an award of compensatory and punitive damages against a
bank for breach of duties in connection with a trust agreement involving a pension
and profit-sharing plan for employees of plaintiff law firm).
Courts in California and a number of other states have recognized causes of action for "breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," and on this basis
have awarded punitive damages, damages for mental anguish, and other forms of relief not generally available in contract actions. See generally Bourhis, Recognition
and Recovery for Bad Faith Torts, 18 TRIAL 37 (1982); Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing, 30 INS. DEF. L.J.
411 (1981); Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 190-206 (1982); Sullivan, supra note 78, at
240-44.
81. Jones, Win Punitive Damages In Arbitration, ABA. J. May 1, 1987, at 87.
82. 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 501-02, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03.
85. Id. at 505, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
86. Id. at 506, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
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because the New York arbitration statute allowed only claims which

"may be the subject of an action,' '8 7 and the court reasoned that the

penalty provision was unenforceable under any proper theory of
law.88
Twenty-two years later, the issue of punitive arbitration awards
reached the New York Appellate Division again in Associated General Contractors v. Savin Brothers,8 9 with a different result." The
Savin court upheld an arbitrator's award of $104,000 (three times
the maximum loss that Savin might have sustained), reasoning that
the elimination of the "subject of an action" language from the New
York statute rendered Publishers' Association distinguishable.," By
viewing the Publishers' Association decision as relying solely on the
"subject of an action" language, the Savin court was able to freely
balance the public policy favoring arbitration and the public policy
voiding penalties, finding the former to be weightier.9 2 Through
somewhat dubious reasoning, the Savin majority clouded the issue
of whether punitive damages could be awarded in arbitration."3
Chief Judge Breitel's strong dissent ' 4 laid the groundwork for the
eventual triumph of his position in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc."5
Although Publisher's Association and Savin were both New
York Appellate Division cases, they were representative of the common law nationwide. As the first state to enact a statute encouraging
arbitration, New York has been a pioneer in the development of arbitration law, providing guidance for other states both because of
the wealth of precedent it produces and because statutes in other
jurisdictions have been modeled upon the New York legislation."8
2. Garrity: Prohibitionof Punitive Arbitration Awards
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.97 was the first case to hold unequivocally that punitive damages may not be awarded in arbitration
under a modern arbitration statute. In Garrity, a prominent author
87.
88.
89.
N.Y.2d

Id. (citing N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1448 (Mck. 1963)).
Id.
45 App. Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36
957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975).

90. Id.
91. Id. at 141-42, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
92. Id. at 142, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380.

93. A student commentator has stated that Publisher'sAssociation and Savin

are irreconcilable. Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 272, 282-83 (1978).
94. 36 N.Y.2d at 959, 335 N.E.2d at 860, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Judges Jasen and
Gabrielli joined the dissent).
95. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 253 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
96. See generally M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 4.01-4.03 (1984) (discussion of arbitration statutes and federal arbitration law).

97. 40 N.Y.2d at 354, 353 N.E.2d at 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
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sued her publisher for fraudulent inducement and "gross" underpayment of royalties, as well as for various "malicious" acts. Garrity's contract contained a broad arbitration provision. The arbitration panel awarded Garrity $45,000 in compensatory damages and a
further $7,500 in punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, vacated the award of punitive damages.
Citing Publishers' Association, Judge Breitel's opinion for the
Garrity majority enunciated a sweeping rule: "An arbitrator has no
power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties .

.

... 9 At the root of the Garrity doctrine is the notion that

freedom to contract does not include the freedom to impose penalties.9" If parties may not agree to punish, and the sole source of an
arbitrator's power is the agreement, then the arbitrator has no
grounds upon which to levy punitive sanctions.
The public policy expressed in Garrity, which the court believed was "of such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its contravention,"10 was supported by several rationales. First,
the court noted that punitive damages have not been awarded in
breach of contract actions on a historical basis.101 Second, the court
reasoned that allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages would
"amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial power," thereby displacing courts as the arbiters of social justice.'0 2 Third, the court
observed that the absence of guidelines for arbitral awards, coupled
with the limited range of judicial supervision, might result in unpredictable and uncontrollable awards.103 Fourth, the court theorized
that one party could obtain an unfair advantage through manipulation of the arbitrator. 04 Finally, the court speculated that punitive
arbitration awards would erode confidence in the arbitral process
and discourage its use. 105
3.

The Post-Garrity-PreWilloughby Period

Although Garrity was severely criticized, 1 "1 it was frequently
followed for the proposition that punitive damages are not available
98. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (emphasis added).
99. "The law does not and should not permit private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved to the State. The freedom of contract does not embrace the freedom to punish, even by contract." Id. at 360, 353
N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
100. Id. at 355, 353 N.E.2d 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
101. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
102. Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Note, Arbitration: The Award of Punitive Damages as a Public Policy
Question, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 546, 550-51 (1977).
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in arbitration.10 7 However, even though Garrityrepresented the majority rule, many courts acted contrary to the Garrity rule, compelling arbitration of punitive damage claims along with other types of
controversies within the scope of the arbitration agreement.10, Although these decisions failed to directly address the appropriateness
of punitive damages in arbitration, they indicated dissatisfaction
with, or confusion over the Garrity ruling. At least two state appel107. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59,
63 (8th Cir. 1984) (court acknowledged, without discussion, that if appellees argue
their fraud claims in arbitration they will be unable to recover punitive damages);
Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (court applied New York law which rendered punitive damages unavailable in an arbitration
award), rev'd on other grounds, 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984); Baselski v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a party to an
agreement containing an arbitration clause waives the right to seek punitive damages
in any forum); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("Since arbitration arises out of a contractual relationship, punitive damages are unavailable because parties may not contract to benefit from or be
penalized by punitive damages"); School City of E. Chicago, Indiana v. E. Chicago
Fed'n of Teachers, Local 511, 422 N.E.2d 656, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (arbitrator's
award of punitive damages void because the award was contrary to state public policy
and would not further the purposes of punitive damages); Cone Mills Corp. v. August
F. Nielsen Co., 90 A.D.2d 31, 33-34, 455 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(punitive damages unavailable in arbitration).
108. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978) (involving a former registered representative's claims against a securities firm
for wrongful termination); Corcoran v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 596 F. Supp.
1113 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving claims of willful and malicious breach of fiduciary
duty by customers against a commodities broker); Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (involving claims by a general securities representative against its employer for alleged tortious misconduct); Sports
Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (involving claims of fraud
and intentional and willful breach of lease); Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., 583 F.
Supp. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (involving a customer's claim of negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation against a securities firm); Creson v.
Quickprint of America, 558 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (involving licensees' allegations of fraud in inducement of commercial franchise agreements); Ging v. ParkerHunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (court referred claims for punitive damages to arbitration, implicitly holding that arbitrators have the authority to consider
such claims and grant the requested relief); Coudert v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 122 (D. Conn. 1982) (involving a former account executive's
claim of alleged defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious
invasion of privacy against her past employer), rev'd on other grounds, 705 F.2d 78
(2d Cir. 1983); Kelleher v. Reich, 532 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (involving a former chief executive's claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a voting
trust agreement by agents of his brokerage firm); Horne v. New England Patriots
Football Club Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465 (D. Mass 1980) (involving a public relations
director's claim of breach of contract arising out of his termination); TAC Travel
America Corp. v. World Airways, 443 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (involving a charterer's claims of defamation against an airline); Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1976) (involving claims arising out of alleged misuse
and mismanagement of partnership property); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), (claims for
punitive damages are subject to arbitration), aff'd., 476 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1985); Van C.
Argiris and Co. v. Pain/Wetzel & Assocs., 63 Ill. App. 3d 993, 380 N.E.2d 825 (1978)
(involving a claim of malicious interference with a contractual relationship).
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late courts went further, however, and held that an arbitration panel
has the authority to award punitive damages, although neither court
discussed Garrity.0 9 At the same time, the First Circuit upheld an
arbitral award despite its conclusion that the award was punitive in
nature.110

The first clear break from the Garrity rule occurred in Willis v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc."' The Willis case involved a customer-brokerage agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out
of transactions between the parties. The customer complained of
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. He requested punitive damages.
The customer opposed the brokerage firm's request for arbitration,
fearing that the arbitrators would apply New York law (as required
in the arbitration clause), and therefore apply the Garrity rule and
deny him punitive damages.
The court, however, applied the Federal Arbitration Act, because the agreement between the parties evidenced a transaction in
interstate commerce. '1 2 Thus, the court was able to distinguish Garrity on the ground that it restricted the power of arbitrators only
under New York state law, not federal law.' Although the arbitration clause did not refer to punitive damages, the court concluded
that the broad language of the arbitration provision included claims
for punitive damages since public policy did not prohibit arbitrators
from resolving issues of punitive damages and any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."'
B. Willoughby: The Confirmation Of Punitive Arbitral Awards
The seminal case for the validity of punitive arbitral awards is
Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., v. Kajima InternationalInc."'
In Willoughby, the Willoughby Roofing Company entered into a
construction contract with the general contractor, Kajima International, Inc. Following acceptance of Willoughby's bid, Kajima materially altered the specifications to such an extent that the comple109. Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Const., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1984) (because the arbitration agreement expressly allowed punitive damages,
there was no basis for modifying an arbitration award which included punitive damages); Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, 44 Md. App. 688, 690, 410 A.2d.
630, 632 (1980) (under the health care malpractice claim statute, arbitration panel
has authority to award punitive damages).
110. Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston v. Metro Auto Salesman Local Union
No. 122, 588 F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir. 1978).
111. 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
112. Id. at 823.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 824.
115. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
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tion cost was substantially higher than at the time of bidding.
Although Willoughby Roofing Company had gone to considerable
expense in preparing to fulfill the contract, Kajima cancelled the
contract and engaged another subcontractor when Willoughby Roofing Company sought to renegotiate a new contract. Willoughby
Roofing Company filed suit in state court, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages, while Kajima obtained a stay of the proceedings pending arbitration based upon a broad arbitration clause in
the contract." 6 The arbitration panel awarded the Willoughby Roofing Company $41,091 in compensatory damages and $108,909 in punitive damages, based upon a finding of "willful misrepresentation
' 7
of material fact." "
The Willoughby court applied federal law and federal policy
contained in the Federal Arbitration Act" 8 because the construction
contract was a transaction involving interstate commerce to which
the policies and provisions of the Arbitration Act apply." 9 Even
though the parties to the contract agreed that Alabama law should
govern the resolution of issues submitted to arbitration, the court
found that "'federal law governs the categories of claims subject to
arbitration' and the 'resolution of issues concerning the arbitration
provision's interpretation, construction, validity, revocability, and
For this reason, the trial court distinguished
enforceability.' "1
Garrity, which restricted the power of arbitrators only under New
York law, not federal law.
The Willoughby court held that the standard arbitration clause
was broad enough to empower the arbitration panel to award punitive damages.'' To arrive at this conclusion, the court initially
noted that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration requires the
liberal construction of arbitration agreements.'
Since arbitrators
have broad remedial powers to fashion a remedy,' the court continued, the specific remedy need not be authorized by the arbitration agreement. 2 4 Rather, the court stated, any limitation upon the
arbitrator's broad remedial powers should be clearly and expressly
stated in the arbitration agreement. 25 The court concluded that
since the arbitration agreement in Willoughby did not expressly
116. Id. at 355-56.
117. Id. at 354-55.

118. 9 U.S.C. § 1-208 (1982).
119.

Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 359.

120. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,

569 F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983)).
121. Id. at 357.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 357-58.
124. Id. at 357.
125. Id. at 358.
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prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, the arbitration
panel should
be empowered to award such damages where
12 6
appropriate.

Next, the Willoughby court carefully analyzed, and rejected the
theoretical underpinnings of the Garrity doctrine. First, the court
rejected Garrity's fear of the displacement of the judicial system,
noting that "the very purpose of the [Arbitration] Act was to overrule longstanding judicial precedent which declared

. . .

arbitration

to be contrary to public policy as displacing the functions of the
courts." 2 Second, the Willoughby court observed that arbitral
awards would further the purposes of punitive damages as effectively as judicial awards. 21 Moreover, the Willoughby court reasoned that an arbitrator's practical sensibilities and experience in
the relevant field would often put him in a better position than a
judge to discern appropriate punitive awards. 2 '
Finally, the Willoughby court found the Garrity concern with
the superior party's manipulation of arbitrators unpersuasive on two
grounds: (1) the Arbitration Act provides a check on fraudulent activities, 13 0 and (2) "the possibility of an occasional abuse of power is
no grounds for an absolute bar on the award of punitive damages by
arbitrators.' 81
Thus, the Willoughby court's rationale for allowing punitive
damages was based, in a large part, upon the negative practical effects of precluding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. The
Willoughby court noted that where a claim for punitive damages is
made, "the Garrity rule .. .would require two trials-one before

the arbitrator and a separate judicial trial on essentially the same
126. Id. at 357.
127. Id. at 362-63 (citing Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984)).
128. Id. at 363.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 362. The Arbitration Act provides for vacation of an arbitral award
"[wihere the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means" or where
there was "evident partiality or corruption" in the arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a),(b)
(1970).
In addition, although not noted by the Willoughby court, the arbitrator selection
mechanisms, such as those promulgated by the American Arbitration Association,
serve to substantially reduce any chance of arbitrator manipulation. CONSTR. INDUS.
ARBITRATION RULES Rule 13 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1984). According to the standard
process the Association submits to the parties a list of proposed arbitrators. Id. Each
party may reject any or all of the proposed arbitrators, and then rank any remaining
ones according to preference. Id. The American Arbitration Association then makes
appointments from the proposed arbitrators by mutual preference. Id. If none are
mutually acceptable, the American Arbitration Association appoints the panel. Id.
Parties not wishing to subscribe to the standard process may specify in the agreement
who shall serve as arbitrators or may provide a method for the arbitrator's selection.

Id. Rules 14-15.
131.

Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 362.
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facts-obviously a wasteful exercise. "132 The Willoughby court
stated that consequently the rule "would undermine the chief advantages and purposes of arbitration" in relieving congestion in the
8
courts and in achieving a quick, inexpensive dispute resolution.
By submitting a dispute to arbitration, the court hypothesized, a
plaintiff might unwittingly forfeit the right to punitive damages because of the res judicata effect of arbitration awards. 8 4 Moreover,
even if the punitive damage claim were not barred, a party could
decide to forego its claims rather than endure the difficulty and expense of a separate trial on punitive damages. "Merely by agreeing
to arbitrate," the Willoughby court stated, "a defendant could escape the mandatory sanction of punitive damages that the law
would otherwise impose," and thereby thwart the public policy underlying punitive damages. "
In conclusion, the Court noted that in some instances arbitration may be "less desirable than a full judicial trial.""', The Willoughby court stated, however, that once the parties have agreed to
arbitrate "all claims" and have vested the arbitrator with the power
to grant "any remedy," they should suffer the consequences of their
bargain. 8 7 Put simply, Willoughby teaches that if parties to an arbitration agreement wish to exclude the issue of punitive damages
from arbitration, they should so specify in the arbitration
agreement. "
C.

Post-Willoughby: The Trend In Favor Of Punitive Damages

Since the watershed Willoughby ruling, courts have had the opportunity to directly address the issue of the awardability of punitive damages in arbitration in five cases. The overwhelming weight
of authority is to allow punitive damages in arbitration; indeed, only
one post-Willoughby case has failed to follow the Willoughby rule.
In Shaw v. Kuhnel & Associates, Inc., 89 the plaintiff brought
an action for breach of contract and fraud, seeking punitive damages. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in dicta, stated, "We also
determine that an arbitrator should not be given authority to award
132. Id. at 364 (citing Note, Punitive Damages In Arbitration: The Search For
a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 299 (1978)).
133. Id. at 364 (citing Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179
(11th Cir. 1981)).
134. Id. at 363. At least one court has barred a claim for punitive damages even
though the arbitrators were not permitted to grant them. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
135. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363.
136. Id. at 364.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 365.
139. 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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punitive damages. This power is reserved to the courts."' 40 The
Shaw court did not mention Willoughby, discuss Garrity,or address
the issue of punitive damages in arbitration any further. It appears
that the court merely tagged its brief repudiation of punitive arbitral awards to the opinion without intent to make law or, at the
least, without much thought. Clearly, Shaw is a backwater in the
stream of well-reasoned case law following the Willoughby rule.
In Baker v. Sadick,"' the California Court of Appeals affirmed
an arbitrator's award of $300,000 in punitive damages in a medical
malpractice case. Dr. Sadick claimed on appeal that the award of
punitive damages violated California law and public policy. The
Baker court disagreed, stating that public policy, at least in California, favored arbitration. 4 2 The court rejected Dr. Sadick's further
argument that arbitration will be discouraged if arbitrators can
award punitive damages, because fearful litigants may limit the
scope of the arbitration clause to exclude punitive damages from arbitration. 4 8 The court thought it most important that arbitration be
placed on equal footing with judicial proceedings.'44 The court
stated: "Arbitration serves as a substitute for proceedings in court.
As a substitute, arbitration would not be encouraged by a decision
which effectively holds a claim, which may otherwise be asserted in
a court of law, may not be asserted in arbitration."' 45
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 46 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a punitive damage claim was arbitrable
under the state's arbitration statute. In Rodgers, the plaintiff had
been employed to construct a housing project for the defendant corporation. The construction contract contained a "broad-form" arbitration clause. The plaintiff filed a claim for fraud, unfair and
deceptive trade practices and misrepresentation, and requested arbitration. The plaintiff was awarded $407,259 in full settlement of all
47
claims.
The plaintiff contractor then sought to enforce the award in
state court and filed an amended complaint seeking punitive damages. The defendant moved for, and was granted, summary judgment on the ground of res judicata. The Rodgers court affirmed the
summary judgment and rejected plaintiff's contention that the punitive damage claim was not arbitrable, stating: "We detect no public
140.
354, 353
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 609, 698 P.2d at 882 (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stewart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d
N.E.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1976)).
162 Cal. App. 3d, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 682-83.
Id.
331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. App. 1985).
Id. at 728.
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policy in this State prohibiting the arbitration of claims for punitive
damages which fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement
. . . . We conclude that such claims are arbitrable and that the
agreement here is sufficiently broad to empower the arbitrators to
award punitive damages."148
In In re Costa and Head (Atrium), Ltd., 4 9 the Supreme Court
of Alabama also followed the Willoughby doctrine. In Costa and
Head (Atrium), Ltd., a construction dispute arose between the general contractor and the owner of an office development project. The
general contractor argued that his claim for punitive damages
should not be submitted to arbitration. The court rejected that concept and, citing Willoughby, affirmed the award of punitive damages
under the broadly drafted arbitration agreement. 5 '
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Wise, 5 ' the Arizona
appellate court upheld the arbitrator's award of punitive damages
against an automobile insurer. The court noted that the automobile
insurance policy did not specifically exclude punitive damages from
its uninsured motorist coverage, pursuant to which the insured filed
the arbitration proceeding.
This evolution of jurisprudence in this area reveals the basic
tension between the modern doctrine favoring arbitration and judicial perceptions of the inherent limitations of the arbitration process." 5' Nevertheless, the case law reveals that the clear trend is to
empower arbitrators to award punitive damages. However, the risks
and criticisms of punitive damages as a general proposition apply
with equal or greater force to punitive arbitral awards. These criticisms warrant a careful review of the dangers of punitive damages,
and of the guidelines which may minimize these dangers.
IV.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERATION AND AWARD OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION

In a recent study, a special committee of the American Bar Association noted fundamental problems in the law and practice of punitive damages in judicial proceedings.""3 These concerns are magni148. Id. at 734.
149. 486 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1986).
150. Id. at 1276.
151. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Wise, 721 P.2d 674, 675 (Ariz. App. 1986)
("the arbitrators were within their authority in awarding punitive damages" against
an automobile insurer because the automobile policy between the parties did not specifically exclude punitive damages from its uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to
which the defendant/insured brought arbitration.)
152. 66 B.U.L. REv. 953, 970-72 (1986).
153. Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination, Report of the Special
Committee on Punitive Damages Section of Litigation, American Bar Association
(1986).
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fled in the arbitration setting because, as a general proposition,
arbitrators are not as familiar with relevant legal standards and are
subject to judicial review only on narrow grounds."'
The following guidelines should allow arbitrators to do justice
in each proceeding, while ensuring that punitive damages are
awarded in a consistent and rational fashion. These guidelines echo
some of the recommendations of the Special Committee's study (the
"ABA Report"), and would add an element of uniformity to the
award of punitive damages in the arbitration process.
To insure uniformity of punitive damage standards, the American Arbitration Association and self-regulatory organizations, such
as the National Futures Association, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the various securities exchanges, should adopt
these guidelines.
A. Conduct/State of Mind
The ABA Report concluded that there are four major problems
with the existing legal standards for the award of punitive damages
in a judicial proceeding: first, the standards should be more consistent across state lines; second, the standards in some states are too
loose and would allow an award of punitive damages upon finding
the defendant's conduct to be little more than negligent; third, the
standards should be tailored to the specific underlying causes of action; and fourth, the standards must be comprehensible to the finder
of fact.1 "
In order to award punitive damages, it should be established
that the wrongdoer acted with fraud, malice, or, at the minimum,
"conscious disregard or conscious indifference."'5' The arbitrator
should be persuaded that the state of mind of the defendant, while
not necessarily deliberate or intentional, was characterized by more
than carelessness.
To insure uniformity of conduct standards, the guidelines
154. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages In Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953, 982 n.180 (1986).
155. ABA Committee Report, supra note 153, at 30-31.
156. The ABA Committee Report recommended this standard. Id. at 88. However, the Report noted that any single standard will unduly restrict punitive damages
in some instances (for example, a threshold test that required malice, especially if
actual malice is meant, would eliminate punitive damages in virtually every products
case and would unduly restrict punitives to the true intentional torts, such as assault
and battery. Id. at 31) and might be overly permissive in others (for example, it
might cause a manufacturer to be exposed to punitive liability where it had put out a
product with full awareness that some very small but very real risk was involved). No
product is injury free, and thus the knowing sale of a product with some risk (let us
assume what society would call an acceptable risk) should not be regarded as potentially punitive conduct. Id.
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should be adopted by the American Arbitration Association and apply to all their hearings.
B.

Types of Claims: Commercial Cases

Claims for punitive damages in business and contract cases
should be allowed if the wrongdoing or breach is intentional, without justification, and "special circumstances" exist, such as "unequal
bargaining power" between the parties, a "fiduciary" relationship
between the parties, an exchange rule, governmental regulation, business custom, or practice which the defendant's conduct violates in
letter or spirit, or the existence of high litigation costs disproportionate to the amount of the recovery."5 7
The first part of this guideline-intentional breach without reasonable justification-is essentially a bad faith standard. However,
the allowance of claims for punitive damages upon a showing of bad
faith alone would result in the overdeterrence of socially useful commercial conduct.
The second part of this guideline-a "special circumstances"
test-requires proof of circumstances where compensatory damages
are inadequate to recompense or punish. In each of these "special
circumstances," there is a need for an additional legal deterrent and
punishment above and beyond compensatory damages. 58 Allowing
punitive damages in these instances is consistent with the underlying rationale of punitive damages: deterrence and punishment.
Requiring proof of "special circumstance," in addition to bad
faith, constitutes a logical and desirable limitation upon the availability of punitive damages in contract and commercial cases.
C. Burden of Proof
A plaintiff must be required to prove a punitive damage claim
by "clear and convincing" evidence. 5 9 A "clear and convincing"
standard would ensure that punitive sanctions were sparingly
awarded against those truly deserving of punishment. A "preponderance of evidence" standard runs the risk of punishing conduct not
warranting "penal" damages. Because punitive damages are often
economically crippling and socially stigmatizing, it is better to let
several deserving defendants go without sanctions than levy punitive
sanctions against one undeserving defendant.
157. ABA Committee Report, supra note 153, at 50, 88.
158. Id. at 50-57.
159. The ABA special committee report called for the "clear and convincing"
burden of proof, noting that this is a standard often used in fraud cases, to which
there is some analogy. Id. at 33, 88.
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D. Bifurcation
Mandatory bifurcation of trials-whereby the compensatory
portion of the case is tried first, and the punitive portion second-should not be implemented in arbitration hearings.6s
The advantages of mandatory bifurcation, barely discernable in
a judicial proceeding, are practically non-existent in the arbitration
setting. In the typical judicial proceeding, bifurcation avoids the
confusion a jury may experience in deciding both compensatory and
punitive issues at the same time.'61 Bifurcation also eliminates the
prejudice which may occur when evidence that is related only to punitive damages is introduced during the plaintiff's case in bhief.'"
The role of an arbitrator, however, like that of a judge in a
bench trial, is to sort through the evidence, taking into account what
is proper without becoming prejudiced or confused by extraneous
information. Thus, mandatory bifurcation is a superfluous rule: any
potential prejudice or confusion may be avoided merely by providing the arbitrator with appropriate guidelines.
E. Amount and Judicial Review of Awards
In order to control excessive punitive damage awards, the Arbitration Act should be amended to allow an arbitrator to award up to
three times actual damages, with any award over this amount subject to de novo judicial review."' A recent extensive study 4 of punitive damages awards indicates that excessive punitive awards is a
matter for concern in commercial" suits. 6 A 3:1 ratio "cap" would
have subjected 30-35% of commercial cases awarding punitive damages to appellate review. 6 " Such an objective "cap" on punitive
awards would provide an appropriate gauge for the assessment of
punitive damages.
For example, if the verdict falls within the 3:1 limit, it would be
160. Id. at 88-89.
161. Id. at 58.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 62-64. See Punitive Damage Awards in Maritime Arbitration:A Legitimate Part of Arbitrator'sArsenal, 10 MARITIME LAWYER 251, 268 (1985).
164.

PETERSON, SARMA, & SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 8-45

(Rand Institute 1986) (examined punitive damage awards in all California jurisdictions and Cook County between 1980-84).
165. Commercial cases include claims for money damages for breach of contract, business torts, or unfair business practice. Id. at 9 n.2.
166. The study's examination of personal injury, intentional tort and commercial compensatory to punitive damage ratios, relative frequency of awards, size of
awards, and effect of the awards on an individual versus business defendants, indicate
that the concern for excessive punitive awards is properly directed towards commercial cases. ABA Committee Report, supra note 153, at 22-25 (citing Rand study).
167. Id.
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entitled to the normal judicial deference accorded to arbitration
awards. The award would be subject to review by the standards set
forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act," 8 and the Federal Arbitration
Act. 169 If the verdict exceeded the 3:1 limit, the award would be subject to denovo review, and the plaintiff would be required to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the award.
F. Disclosure of FinancialData
The defendant should be required to disclose financial data to
the arbitrator to ensure that the punitive damage award is an appropriate punishment commensurate with the defendant's wealth. The
court should enter appropriate protective orders to prevent public
disclosures of the financial data.
168. The Uniform Arbitration Act contains similar grounds for review and vacatur and, further, states that the fact that the relief granted by an arbitration award
"was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity" is
not in itself sufficient grounds for judicial vacatur of the award. Id.
169. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1970). Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
provides:
Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing: In either of the following cases the United
States Court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, of either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.

Id. § lo.
Section 11 provides:
Same; modification or correction; grounds; order: In either of the following
cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property
referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon
the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof
and promote justice between the parties.

Id. § 11.
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CONCLUSION

Although most arbitration clauses provide for a final resolution
of all disputes, arbitration proceedings have historically been unable
to offer complete remedies. In upholding an arbitral awrl of punitive damages, the watershed Willoughby ruling tipped the balance
in favor of the full administration of civil justice by arbitrators. The
post-Willoughby jurisprudence represents a clear trend in favor of
the award of punitive damages in arbitration.
Conscious of the inherent risks of punitive damages and the
special concerns of punitive damage awards in the arbitration context, we have recommended changes in law and procedure that will
allow arbitrators to do justice, while ensuring that punitive damages
are awarded in a consistent and rational fashion.

